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Pareto Law in a Kinetic Model of Market with Random Saving Propensity
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We have numerically simulated the ideal-gas models of trading markets, where each agent is
identified with a gas molecule and each trading as an elastic or money-conserving two-body colli-
sion. Unlike in the ideal gas, we introduce (quenched) saving propensity of the agents, distributed
widely between the agents (0 ≤ λ < 1). The system remarkably self-organizes to a critical Pareto
distribution of money P (m) ∼ m−(ν+1) with ν ≃ 1. We analyse the robustness (universality) of
the distribution in the model. We also argue that although the fractional saving ingredient is a
bit unnatural one in the context of gas models, our model is the simplest so far, showing self-
organized criticality, and combines two century-old distributions: Gibbs (1901) and Pareto (1897)
distributions.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge;89.90.+n;02.50.-r
Considerable investigations have already been made to
study the nature of income or wealth distributions in
various economic communities, in particular, in differ-
ent countries. For more than a hundred years, it is
known that the probability distribution P (m) for income
or wealth of the individuals in the market decreases with
the wealth m following a power law, known as Pareto law
[1]:
P (m) ∝ m−(1+ν), (1)
where the value of the exponent ν is found to lie be-
tween 1 and 2 [2, 3, 4]. It is also known that typically
less than 10% of the population in any country possesses
about 40% of the wealth and follow the above power law.
The rest of the low-income group population, in fact the
majority, clearly follows a different law, identified very
recently to be the Gibbs distribution [5, 6, 7]. Studies
on real data show that the high income group indeed fol-
low Pareto law, with ν varying from 1.6 for USA [6], to
1.8− 2.2 in Japan [3]. The value of ν thus seem to vary
a little from economy to economy.
We have studied here numerically a gas model of a
trading market. We have considered the effect of saving
propensity of the traders. The saving propensity is as-
sumed to have a randomness. Our observations indicate
that Gibbs and Pareto distributions fall in the same cat-
egory and can appear naturally in the century-old and
well-established kinetic theory of gas [8]: Gibbs distribu-
tion for no saving and Pareto distribution for agents with
quenched random saving propensity. Our model study
also indicates the appearance of self-organized criticality
[9] in the simplest model so far, namely in the kinetic
theory of gas models, when the stability effect of savings
[10] is incorporated.
We consider an ideal-gas model of a closed economic
system where total moneyM and total number of agents
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N is fixed. No production or migration occurs and the
only economic activity is confined to trading. Each agent
i, individual or corporate, possess money mi(t) at time
t. In any trading, a pair of traders i and j randomly
exchange their money [5, 7, 11], such that their total
money is (locally) conserved and none end up with neg-
ative money (mi(t) ≥ 0, i.e, debt not allowed):
mi(t) +mj(t) = mi(t+ 1) +mj(t+ 1); (2)
time (t) changes by one unit after each trading. The
steady-state (t→∞) distribution of money is Gibbs one:
P (m) = (1/T ) exp(−m/T );T =M/N. (3)
Hence, no matter how uniform or justified the initial
distribution is, the eventual steady state corresponds to
Gibbs distribution where most of the people have got
very little money. This follows from the conservation of
money and additivity of entropy:
P (m1)P (m2) = P (m1 +m2). (4)
This steady state result is quite robust and realistic too!
In fact, several variations of the trading, and of the ‘lat-
tice’ (on which the agents can be put and each agent
trade with its ‘lattice neighbors’ only), whether compact,
fractal or small-world like [2], leaves the distribution un-
changed. Some other variations like random sharing of
an amount 2m2 only (not of m1 +m2) when m1 > m2
(trading at the level of lower economic class in the trade),
lead to even drastic situation: all the money in the mar-
ket drifts to one agent and the rest become truely pauper
[12, 13].
In any trading, savings come naturally [10]. A saving
propensity factor λ is therefore introduced in the same
model [7] (see [11] for model without savings), where each
trader at time t saves a fraction λ of its money mi(t) and
trades randomly with the rest:
mi(t+1) = mi(t)+∆m; mj(t+1) = mj(t)−∆m (5)
2where
∆m = (1− λ)[ǫ{mi(t) +mj(t)} −mi(t)], (6)
ǫ being a random fraction, coming from the stochastic
nature of the trading.
The market (non-interacting at λ = 0 and 1) becomes
‘interacting’ for any non-vanishing λ(< 1): For fixed λ
(same for all agents), the steady state distribution Pf (m)
of money is exponentially decaying on both sides with
the most-probable money per agent shifting away from
m = 0 (for λ = 0) to M/N as λ → 1 (Fig. 1(a)).
This self-organizing feature of the market, induced by
sheer self-interest of saving by each agent without any
global perspective, is quite significant as the fraction of
paupers decrease with saving fraction λ and most peo-
ple end up with some fraction of the average money in
the market (for λ → 1, the socialists’ dream is achieved
with just people’s self-interest of saving!). Interestingly,
self-organisation also occurs in such market models when
there is restriction in the commodity market [14]. Al-
though this fixed saving propensity does not give yet the
Pareto-like power-law distribution, the Markovian na-
ture of the scattering or trading processes (eqn. (4))
is lost and the system becomes co-operative. Indirectly
through λ, the agents get to know (start interacting with)
each other and the system co-operatively self-organises
towards a most-probable distribution (mp 6= 0).
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FIG.1: Steady state money distribution (a) Pf (m) for the fixed
(same for all agents) λ model, and (b) P˜f (m) for some typical
values of λ in the distributed λ model. The data is collected from
the ensembles with N = 200 agents. The inset in (b) shows the
scaling behavior of P˜f (m). For all cases, agents start with average
money per agent M/N = 1.
In a real society or economy, λ is a very inhomogeneous
parameter: the interest of saving varies from person to
person. We move a step closer to the real situation where
saving factor λ is widely distributed within the popula-
tion. One again follows the same trading rules as before,
except that
∆m = ǫ(1− λj)mj(t)− (1− λi)(1 − ǫ)mi(t) (7)
here; λi and λj being the saving propensities of agents i
and j. The agents have fixed (over time) saving propensi-
ties, distributed independently, randomly and uniformly
(white) within an interval 0 to 1 (see [15] for preliminary
results): agent i saves a random fraction λi (0 ≤ λi < 1)
and this λi value is quenched for each agent (λi are in-
dependent of trading or t). Starting with an arbitrary
initial (uniform or random) distribution of money among
the agents, the market evolves with the tradings. At each
time, two agents are randomly selected and the money
exchange among them occurs, following the above men-
tioned scheme. We check for the steady state, by looking
at the stability of the money distribution in successive
Monte Carlo steps t. Eventually, after a typical relax-
ation time (∼ 105 for N = 200 and uniformly distributed
λ) dependent on N and the distribution of λ, the money
distribution becomes stationary. After this, we average
the money distribution over ∼ 103 time steps. Finally
we take configurational average over ∼ 105 realizations
of the λ distribution to get the money distribution P (m).
It is found to follow a strict power-law decay. This de-
cay fits to Pareto law (1) with ν = 1.02± 0.02 (Fig. 2).
Note, for finite size N of the market, the distribution has
a narrow initial growth upto a most-probable value mp
after which it falls off with a power-law tail for several
decades. As can be seen from the inset of Fig. 2, this
Pareto law (with ν ≃ 1) covers the entire range in m of
the distribution P (m) in the limit N →∞. We checked
that this power law is extremely robust: apart from the
uniform λ distribution used in the simulations in Fig. 2,
we also checked the results for a distribution
ρ(λ) ∼ |λ0 − λ|
α, λ0 6= 1, 0 < λ < 1, (8)
of quenched λ values among the agents. The Pareto law
with ν = 1 is universal for all α. The data in Fig. 2
corresponds to λ0 = 0, α = 0. For negative α values,
however, we get an initial (small m) Gibbs-like decay in
P (m) (see Fig. 3).
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FIG.2: Steady state money distribution P (m) in the model for
distributed λ (0 ≤ λ < 1) for N = 1000 agents. Inset shows that
the most probable peak mp shifts towards 0 (indicating the same
power law for the entire range of m) as N → ∞: results for four
typical system sizes N = 100, 200, 500, 1000 are shown. For all
cases, agents play with average money per agent M/N = 1.
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FIG.3: Steady state money distribution P (m) in the model for
N = 100 agents with λ distributed as ρ(λ) ∼ λα with different
values of α. The inset shows the region of validity of Pareto law
with 1 + ν = 2. For all cases, agents play with average money per
agent M/N = 1.
In case of uniform distribution of saving propensity λ
(0 ≤ λ < 1), the individual money distribution P˜f (m)
for agents with any particular λ value, although differs
considerably, remains non-monotonic: similar to that for
fixed λ market with mp(λ) shifting with λ (see Fig. 1).
Few subtle points may be noted though: while for fixed
λ the mp(λ) were all less than of the order of unity (Fig.
1(a)), for distributed λ case mp(λ) can be considerably
larger and can approach to the order of N for large λ
(see Fig. 1(b)). The other important difference is in the
scaling behavior of P˜f (m), as shown in the inset of Fig.
1(b). In the distributed λ ensemble, P˜f (m) appears to
have a very simple scaling:
P˜f (m) ∼ (1− λ)F(m(1 − λ)), (9)
for λ → 1, where the scaling function F(x) has non-
monotonic variation in x. The fixed (same for all agents)
λ income distribution Pf (m) do not have any such com-
parative scaling property. It may be noted that a small
difference exists between the ensembles considered in Fig
1(a) and 1(b): while
∫
mPf (m)dm = M (independent
of λ),
∫
mP˜f (m)dm is not a constant and infact ap-
proaches to order of M as λ→ 1. There is also a marked
qualitative difference in fluctuations (see Fig. 4): while
for fixed λ, the fluctuations in time (around the most-
probable value) in the individuals’ moneymi(t) gradually
decreases with increasing λ, for quenched distribution of
λ, the trend gets reversed (see Fig. 4).
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FIG.4: Money of the i-th trader with time. For fixed λ for all
agents in the market: (a) with λ = 0, (b) λ = 0.5, (c) λ = 0.9.
For distributed λ (0 ≤ λ < 1): for agents with (d) λ = 0.1, (e)
λ = 0.5 and (f) λ = 0.9 in the market. All data are for N = 200
(M/N = 1).
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FIG.5: Money distribution in cases where saving propensity λ is
distributed uniformly within a range of values: (a) When width
of λ distribution is 0.5, money distribution shows power-law for
0.5 < λ < 1.0; (b) When width of λ distribution is 0.2, money
distribution starts showing power-law when 0.7 < λ < 0.9. Note,
the exponent ν ≃ 1 in all these cases when the power law is seen.
All data are for N = 100 (M/N = 1).
We now investigate on the range of distribution of the
saving propensities in a certain interval a < λi < b,
where, 0 < a < b < 1. For uniform distribution within
the range, we observe the appearance of the same power
law in the distribution but for a narrower region. As may
be seen from Fig. 5, as a→ b, the power-law behavior is
seen for values a or b approaching more and more towards
4unity: For the same width of the interval |b−a|, one gets
power-law (with same ν) when b → 1. This indicates,
for fixed λ, λ = 0 corresponds to Gibbs distribution, and
one gets Pareto law when λ has got non-zero width of
its distribution extending upto λ = 1. This of course
indicates a crucial role of these high saving propensity
agents: the power law behavior is truely valid upto the
asymptotic limit if λ = 1 is included. Indeed, had we
assumed λ0 = 1 in (8), the Pareto exponent ν immedi-
ately switches over to ν = 1 + α. Of course, λ0 6= 1
in (8) leads to the universality of the Pareto distribu-
tion with ν = 1 (independent of λ0 and α). Indeed this
can be easily rationalised from the scaling behavior (9):
P (m) ∼
∫ 1
0 P˜f (m)ρ(λ)dλ ∼ m
−2 for ρ(λ) given by (8)
and m−(2+α) if λ0 = 1 in (8) (for large m values).
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∫
∞
m
P (m)dm of wealth
m in USA [6] in 1997 and Japan [3] in 2000. Low-income group
follow Gibbs law (shaded region) and the rest (about 5%) of the
rich population follow Pareto law. The inset shows the cumulative
distribution for a model market where the saving propensity of the
agents is distributed following (8) with λ0 = 0 and α = −0.7. The
dotted line (for large m values) corresponds to ν = 1.0.
These model income distributions P (m) compare very
well with the wealth distributions of various countries:
Data suggests Gibbs like distribution in the low-income
range [6] (more than 90% of the population) and Pareto-
like in the high-income range [3] (less than 10% of the
population) of various countries (Fig. 6). In fact, we
have compared one model simulation of the market with
saving propensity of the agents distributed following (8),
with λ0 = 0 and α = −0.7. This model result is shown
in the inset of Fig. 6. The qualitative resemblance of the
model income distribution with the real data for Japan
and USA in recent years is quite intriguing. In fact, for
negative α values in (8), the density of traders with low
saving propensity is higher and since λ = 0 ensemble
yields Gibbs-like income distribution (3), we see an ini-
tial Gibbs-like distribution which crosses over to Pareto
distribution (1) with ν = 1.0 for large m values. The po-
sition of the crossover point depends on the magnitude of
α. The important point to note is that any distribution
of λ near λ = 1, of finite width, eventually gives Pareto
law for large m limit. The same kind of crossover behav-
ior (from Gibbs to Pareto) can also be reproduced in a
model market of mixed agents where λ = 0 for a finite
fraction of population and λ is distributed uniformly over
a finite range near λ = 1 for the rest of the population.
We also considered annealed randomness in the saving
propensity λ: here λi for any agent i changes from one
value to another within the range 0 ≤ λi < 1, after each
trading. Numerical studies for this annealed model did
not show any power law behavior for P (m); rather it
again becomes exponentially decaying on both sides of a
most-probable value.
We have numerically simulated here ideal-gas like mod-
els of trading markets, where each agent is identified with
a gas molecule and each trading as an elastic or money-
conserving two-body collision. Unlike in the ideal gas,
we introduce (quenched) saving propensity of the agents,
distributed widely between the agents (0 ≤ λ < 1). For
quenched random variation of λ among the agents the
system remarkably self-organizes to a critical Pareto dis-
tribution (1) of money with ν ≃ 1.0 (Fig. 2). The ex-
ponent is quite robust: for savings distribution ρ(λ) ∼
|λ0 − λ|
α, λ0 6= 1, one gets the same Pareto law with
ν = 1 (independent of λ0 or α). It may be noted that
the trading market model we have talked about here has
got some apparent limitations. The stochastic nature of
trading assumed here in the trading market, through the
random fraction ǫ in (6), is of course not very straightfor-
ward as agents apparently go for trading with some def-
inite purpose (utility maximization of both money and
commodity). We are however, looking only at the money
transactions between the traders. In this sense, the in-
come distribution we study here essentially corresponds
to ‘paper money’, and not the ‘real wealth’. However,
even taking money and commodity together, one can ar-
gue (see [13]) for the same stochastic nature of the trad-
ings, due to the absence of ‘just pricing’ and the effects
of bargains in the market.
Apart from the intriguing observation that Gibbs
(1901) and Pareto (1897) distributions fall in the same
category and can appear naturally in the century-old and
well-established kinetic theory of gas, that this model
study indicates the appearance of self-organized critical-
ity in the simplest (gas) model so far, when the stability
effect of savings incorporated, is remarkable.
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